may expand in new ways. Medical diagnostic categories, perhaps especially psychiatric categories (Horwitz forthcoming), are often fluid and subject to expansion or contraction. The extension of established diagnoses is especially interesting for it can occur almost unnoticed as a part of regular medical practice and, at the same time, expand the realm of medicalization in significant ways. To examine this phenomenon, we can find a similar process in the social constructionist frame for studying social problems.
"Domain expansion" describes a process by which definitions of social problems expand and become more inclusive (Best 1990; Loseke 1999). Domain expansion encompasses claimsmaking work that extends the definitional boundaries of an established social problem to include similar or related conditions. Best (1990) examined the emerging definitions of child abuse and found that "by 1976, the issue encompassed a much broader array of conditions threatening children. The more general term 'child abuse' had replaced the earlier, narrower concept of 'battered child' and the even broader expression 'child abuse and neglect' had gained currency among professionals" (Best 1990, p. 67). Jenness (1995) has argued how activism by the gay and lesbian movement brought attention to the scope and consequences of anti-gay and lesbian violence. She suggests that domain expansion accompanied social movement growth and was key in reframing violence against gays and lesbians as a "hate crime" and as a specific public issue in the United States. While domain expansion need not always be linked to a social movement, the activities of champions and claims-makers are likely to be critical to the expansion of definitional boundaries. ' This paper examines an analogous process for medicalization, focusing on the emergence of the diagnosis of Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in adults in the 1990s. How did hyperactivity, which was deemed largely a disorder of childhood, become adult ADHD? This research follows on Conrad's study of the medicalization of hyperactivity published in the 1970s (Conrad 1975 (Conrad , 1976 . Our interest here, however, is also to investigate this case as an example of how medicalized categories, once established, can expand to become broader and more inclusive. This category expansion is one means for increasing medicalization and provides us with an opportunity to explore how this aspect of medicalization operates. This paper will focus on key claims and counter-claims made by mental health and medical professionals, as well as lay leaders, support groups, and conferences.2 After reviewing the state of childhood hyperactivity as a medicalized diagnosis in the 1970s, we trace the emergence of "adult hyperactives" among those whose childhood symptoms persisted into adulthood, and then examine how this was transformed into the category "ADHD adults." We show how lay, professional, and media claims helped establish the expanded diagnosis. We identify particular aspects of the social context that contributed to the rise of adult ADHD, and then outline some of the consequences of the medicalization of ADHD in adults and the social implications of expanding diagnostic categories.
The DSM as a Categorical Touchstone
Psychiatric diagnoses are historically and culturally situated. Certain diagnostic categories appear and disappear over time, reflecting and reinforcing particular ideologies within the 1. More recently, Best (1999) has drawn on the work of Stalhngs (1990) to make a distincton between "domain expansion" and "domain elaboration," the latter bemg a process related to domain expansion, which "involves the identification of new aspects of a problem" (Best, 1999, p. 169) The terms "domai elaboration" and "domain expansion" overlap considerably in their meamng and both refer to the way in which expanding categories of social problem results in additional claims-makers and advocates identifying with the problem, promoting its continued problematization, and keeping the problem alive in the public eye. To maintain consistency throughout this paper, we have chosen to use the more familiar term "domain expansion." 2. A recent study by Leffers (1997) focuses on how individuals with ADHD come to understand their problems and how the social construction of the disorder affects this understanding. The present paper is more of a sociological account of the expansion of the ADHD diagnosis to adults. "diagnostic project" (the professional legitimization of diagnoses), as well as within the larger social order (Cooksey and Brown 1998, p. 550). As numerous researchers have noted, psychiatric diagnoses are not necessarily indicators of objective conditions, but are a product of a negotiated interactive process influenced by socio-political factors (Caplan 1995; Cooksey and Brown 1997; Kirk and Kutchins 1992; Kutchins and Kirk 1997) . Diagnoses related to behavior or involving cognitive symptoms are frequently contested or controversial and, as such, diagnosis of "functional diseases" can "represent an implicitly negotiated solution to the problem of idiosyncratic suffering that is not explainable by specific pathology" (Aronowitz 1998, p. 16).
Most psychiatric disorders become legitimated in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), the official guidebook for psychiatric diagnoses. Although DSM does not contain all medical diagnoses, when it comes to behavior, it can be seen as a repository of medicalized categories. Despite psychiatric claims, it is not a scientific document, but a "mix of social values, political compromise, scientific evidence and material for insurance forms" (Kutchins and Kirk 1997, pp. 11, x). As the authoritative voice of psychiatry, the DSM has been used as a mechanism to "secure psychiatric turf" (Kirk and Kutchins 1992) and to sanction psychiatric categories.
The various revisions of DSM have reflected distinct approaches taken by mental health professionals toward understanding human troubles as psychiatric conditions. In 1952, the original version of the DSM reflected the dominance of psychoanalytic thought and sought to "provide a broader set of labels which would be inclusive of the whole society" (Cooksey and Brown 1998, p. 530). A major shift in psychiatric thinking occurred with the publication of DSM-fI in 1980, when the largely psychoanalytic orientation was abandoned and replaced with an avowedly biomedical and categorical approach to diagnosis. "The fundamental premise of DSM-III was that different clusters of symptoms indicated distinct underlying diseases such as schizophrenia, depression, panic disorder and substance abuse" (Horwitz forthcoming, p. 2). The "diagnostic project" was now heralded as a scientific endeavor, a claim that has increased with the publication of DSM-IV (1994), a revision that identifies nearly 400 distinct medical diagnostic entities.
The DSM provides a useful touchstone for the sociological task of understanding how behaviors are defined medically, especially for documenting how criteria for diagnosing a problem change over time and thorough various revised editions. In this way, we can track some of the elasticity of a diagnosis such as ADHD.
Hyperactivity in the 1970s
Although ADHD's roots are often traced to early in the twentieth century (Goldman, et al. 1998 ), it only emerged as a diagnostic category in the 1950s (see Conrad 1975). It was termed at various times Minimal Brain Dysfunction (MBD), Hyperactive Syndrome, Hyperkinesis, Hyperactive Disorder of Childhood, among several other diagnostic categories. While there were slight differences among the categories, in practice, they were interchangeable. The terms Hyperactivity and MBD were most commonly used.
Beginning in 1968, the DSM-II identified "minimal brain damage" and other problems such as "hyperkinetic reaction" as a childhood disorder "characterized by overactivity, restlessness, distractibility, and short attention span, especially in young children; the behavior usually diminishes in adolescence" (APA, 1968, p. 50). The disorders, thus, were defined by both hyperactivity and inattention, two distinguishing features that would persist in various combinations throughout the next 30 years (see also, Stewart, et al. 1966; Stewart 1970; Wender 1971) . Although this official classification clearly placed the hyperactivity within the realm of childhood psychiatric illnesses, it also allowed for the possibility of persistence into adolescence. For example, hyperactive behavior "usually" (but not always) "diminished" (though not necessarily disappeared) by the time the patient entered adolescence. While there was no solid evidence of biological causation, there was an assumption that there was some type of organic pathology.
The most significant criterion for diagnosis was a child's behavior, especially at school. The emphasis in identification was on hyperactive and disruptive behaviors (Conrad 1976). The major treatments for hyperactivity were stimulant medications, especially Ritalin. During the 1960s, the disorder became increasingly well known, due, in part, to publicity it received concerning controversies about drug treatment. By the middle 1970s, it had become the most common childhood psychiatric problem (Gross and Wilson 1974) and special clinics to identify and treat the disorder were established, although most children were diagnosed by their pediatrician or primary care physician.
While there were no methodologically sound epidemiological studies in the 1970s, it was widely estimated that 3-5% of elementary school students were hyperactive (occasionally estimates were as high as 10%). Frequently mentioned estimates suggested between 250,000 and 500,000 children were identified as hyperactive. The disorder was believed to affect boys more often than girls, perhaps at a ratio of 8 to 1. In sum, hyperactivity was seen, fundamentally, as a disorder of childhood, typically identified in the early years of school, which most children were expected to "outgrow" by adolescence.
The Emergence of "Adult Hyperactives"
Beginning in the late 1970s, several cohort studies were published which followed children who had been originally diagnosed with hyperactivity a decade or more earlier and traced their development into adulthood. These studies established that for some hyperactive children, the symptoms persisted into adolescence and even into adulthood. Thus emerged the notion of what we call "adult hyperactives," hyperactive children who did not "outgrow" their symptoms and still manifested some problems as adults.
Weiss and colleagues (1979) followed 75 hyperactive children and 45 matched controls for 15 years. When compared to a matched cohort, they found that clear symptoms persisted for many hyperactive children into adulthood; 66 percent had at least one symptom (Weiss and Hechtman 1986). Most notable was the persistence of restlessness and poor concentration. Despite criticisms that only 60 percent of the children were followed into adulthood, the study remains widely cited, and mis-cited.3 A second prospective study found 31 percent were still diagnosable as hyperactive in late adolesence (Gittleman, et al. 1985 ; see also Mannuzza, et al. 1991; . A follow-up at young adulthood, however, showed a significant decrease of ADD symptoms, to about one-third the rate reported by Weiss. The media has tended to focus on the higher prevalence rates reported in the Weiss data.
Following the publication of these seminal studies, other researchers investigated the persistence of symptoms into adulthood (e.g., Biederman, et al., 1996) to further identify what they believed to be confounding factors (such as co-morbidity with other disorders). These studies reflect the dominant thinking of the late 1980s: any diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD, as the diagnosis was renamed) was found only among adults whose disorder persisted from childhood and, thus, was not a disorder that was either "missed" during childhood or was of adult onset. All ADD adults were hyperactive children grown-up.
The 1980 update, DSM-III, both reflected and facilitated an interest in hyperactivity beyond childhood.4 First, in line with the general trend in DSM-II to define disorders by symptoms, rather than etiology, the updated manual reclassified the disorder according to its 3 For example, although the cohort continued to exhibit signs of hyperactlvity, a twenty-year follow-up found 36% of the cohort symptomatic-a less widely reported statistic (e.g., Newsweek, 1990). Even "experts" (such as Edward Hallowell) are cited m the popular literature referring to "seventy percent of the kids who have it continue to suffer symptoms as adults" (Stich 1993 , p. 77). The figure of 70% appears to come from a study published by Wender in 1995, but is not the most accepted estimate of persistence of symptoms.
4. DSM-III, the third revision, aimed for more rigorous diagnoses and represented the dominance of the biopsychiatnc viewpoint in psychiatry over other perspectives (Cooksey and Brown 1998). primary symptoms: either hyperactivity or inattention. Thus, the diagnosis focused on attention deficits with two major subtypes: Attention-Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity and AttentionDeficit Disorder without Hyperactivity (deemed the less severe of the two categories). The symptoms were focused largely on children's activities (e.g., "runs about or climbs on things excessively," "frequently calls out in class," "has difficulty concentrating on schoolwork or other tasks requiring sustained attention"). To be diagnosed, patients needed to exhibit symptoms before age seven.
Secondly, the range of behaviors included within the official diagnosis became more comprehensive. Some symptoms were related to school-based behavior, such as "frequently calls out in class"; whereas others were more interpersonal and ephemeral in nature, e.g., "often acts before thinking" or "is easily distracted." These changes in the diagnostic category meant that individuals who may not have "qualified" for a diagnosis of hyperkinetic reaction or minimal brain damage under DSM-II, now could now be thought of as having ADD under DSM-III. Both subtypes of ADD permitted courses of the disorder in which "all symptoms persist into adolescence or adulthood" or that "hyperactivity disappears, but other signs persist into adolescence or adulthood" (APA 1980, p. 42). Thus, the DSM-III definition expanded the diagnostic criteria in terms of necessary "symptoms," while allowing for the possibility for persistence into adulthood.
The Development of "ADHD Adults"
In the 1987 revision, DSM-IIIR, ADD was renamed "Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder" (ADHD) to reassert the condition of hyperactivity as one possible, but not mandated, symptom of the disorder. ADHD enabled children who were hyperactive and impulsive, but less inattentive to meet the diagnostic criteria. Over 50% more children received ADHD diagnoses under these criteria (Newcorn, et al. 1989 ). The revised diagnostic criteria did not refer to the disorder in adulthood, but opened the door slightly for an expanded definition beyond "adult hyperactives" to "ADHD adults" who had no childhood diagnosis. For example, the environment in which ADHD symptoms occurred had expanded to the workplace: "In the classroom or workplace, inattention or impulsiveness are evidenced . . ." (APA 1987, p. 50). There was less emphasis on school-aged behaviors: "frequently calls out in class" (DSM-III) became "often blurts out answers to questions before they have been completed." The criteria of exhibiting symptoms before age seven was retained, and although the revision obliquely acknowledged the possibility of post-childhood ADHD, adult ADHD was not highlighted in the manual.
Early Claims
In the same year that the DSM-III-R was published, two publications aimed at lay readers heralded a new category of "ADHD Adults"-adults who had not been diagnosed as children, but had suffered from symptoms. Although later claims would be made by those who could not trace their suffering to their youth, these early claims were made either by or for those who, retrospectively, could identify signs of ADHD in their childhood.
In 1987, Paul Wender, a longtime hyperactivity researcher, published a book that examined hyperactivity throughout the life span. Although the book was entitled, The Hyperactive Child, Adolescent and Adult, only one chapter described adults with ADHD symptoms. Nonetheless, the book targeted a lay audience and would be cited frequently in subsequent years.
The same year, Frank Wolkenberg (1987) , a free-lance photographer and picture editor, wrote a first-person account in the New York Times Magazine about his discovery that he had ADHD despite his apparently successful life. When he sought treatment for depression and suicidal ideation, he was diagnosed with ADHD by a psychologist whose specialty was learning disorders. Wolkenberg then began reinterpreting several clues from early in his life (e.g., impulsivity, distractibility, disorganization, and emotional volatility) as signs of the disorder. This highly visible testimony of someone not previously diagnosed with ADHD as a child put the idea of "ADHD Adults" into the public realm. No one had diagnosed him as hyperactive as a child, yet now, he was attributing "seemingly inexplicable failures ... all unnecessary and many inexcusable" (p. 62) to ADHD. He suggested it was a neurobiological dysfunction "of genetic origin," thus attributing his life problems to a chemical imbalance.
As the notion of ADHD in adulthood was filtering into the public, the psychiatric profession was also turning attention to this new problem. Clinics for adults with ADHD were established at Wayne State University in 1989 and two years later at the University of Massachusetts in Worcester (Jaffe 1995).
In 1990, Dr. Alan Zametkin of the National Institute of Mental Health and several of his colleagues published an often-cited article in the New England Journal of Medicine. Using positron-emission tomography (PET) scanning to measure brain metabolism, Zametkin demonstrated different levels of brain activity in individuals with ADHD compared to those without the disorder, providing new evidence for a biologic basis for ADHD. Because of the risks inherent in research involving radiologic images, the researchers used adult subjects who both had childhood histories of hyperactivity and were biological parents of hyperactive children. Although not their intention, Zametkin's work became one of the key professional sources cited by others to demonstrate the presence of ADHD in adults (e.g., Bartlett 1990; and Newsweek, December 3, 1990), since it appeared to bolster claims that ADHD could persist into or develop during adulthood.5 While the study made national headlines, additional follow-up studies which did not confirm the strength of the initial study's findings, received no widespread publicity from the professional and lay press.6
Adult ADHD in the Public Sphere
Writing about ADHD as a disorder in adults has been increasing in the professional literature for years. As can be seen in Table 1 , by the middle 1980s there were over 40 articles in the medical literature and about a dozen in the psychological literature published per year (with some overlap). Many of these articles were minor and nearly all dealt with the persistence of symptoms in hyperactive children as they reached adulthood. The issue of "ADHD adults" per se did not reach the popular media until the 1990s (see Table 1 ) and in a moderate, but growing number of articles. But the idea that adults could have ADHD did spread with the help of a variety of media.
By the early 1990s, several books written for a popular audience looking specifically at ADHD adults were published. Psychologist Lynn Weiss (1992) identified her adult subjects as those who were diagnosable with ADHD, not merely grown-up hyperactive children having remnants of the symptoms carried over from an earlier condition. Another popular book quickly followed with the provocative title of, You Mean I'm Not Lazy, Stupid or Crazy?! (Kelly and Ramundo 1993), emphasizing the shift in responsibility that being diagnosed with adult ADHD can bring. Thom Hartmann (1994), writing in a somewhat esoteric, but essentially sociobiological frame, associated ADHD with an evolutionary adaptation to the social environment. He likened those with ADHD to hunters (who are nomadic, scanning the environment for sustenance, seeking of sensation, reacting quickly and decisively) adapting to a more mod-5. Referencing the work of others, Zametkin noted that "the disorder is probably inhented in certain families" and "symptoms persist into adulthood in 40 to 60 percent of the persons with childhood hyperactivity," but these claims were primarily in the context of justifying using an adult sample (Zametkin, et al. 1990 , p. 1361).
6 The follow-up studies using adolescent populations produced vaned results (e.g., Ernst, et al 1994, Zametkin, et al. 1993 ). Additionally, with more evidence in, scientists are less sure that PETs establish a clear marker of ADHD-in children or in adults. The message was reiterated in popular magazines. A feature article in Newsweek, for example, described a 38-year old security guard who held more than 128 jobs since leaving college after being enrolled in the academic institution for 13 years (Cowley and Ramo 1993). He finally "received a diagnosis that changed his life" at the adult ADHD clinic at the University of Massachusetts in Worcester. Similarly, an article in Ladies' Home Journal (Stich 1993) described a husband who would continually be fired from job after job, constantly interrupted his wife, and forgot details of conversations. Then "Two years ago, the Pearsons' discovered there was a medical reason for Chuck's problems. After their son was diagnosed with attention deficit disorder (ADD) ... they learned Chuck also had the condition" (Stich 1993, p. 74). The article does not mention the fact that Chuck, who was diagnosed at age 54, also went on to found the Adult Attention Deficit Foundation, which acts as a clearinghouse for information about adult ADHD (Wallis, 1994, p. 47).
Adult ADHD was given a great boost in 1994 with the publication of a best-selling book Driven to Distraction by Edward Hallowell and John Ratey (1994), two psychiatrists with prestigious organizational affiliations. Hallowell offered his own experience as the springboard for the book: although successful as a medical student, and later as a practicing psychiatrist, he came to believe he had ADHD. Ratey also stated he had ADHD. The book has become a crucial touchstone among the lay public. Using their clinical experience as the basis for their book, Hallowell and Ratey (1994) argue that ADHD takes various forms. Based upon their clinical experience, Hallowell and Ratey propose "suggested diagnostic criteria for attention deficit disorder in adults" (p. 76). These criteria recognize the disorder without hyperactivity. They present thirteen sub-types of the disorder, a set of "suggested diagnostic criteria," and offer a 100-question test (with elusive criteria7) for readers to assess whether or not they may need to seek evaluation for ADHD. The authors urge readers not to self-diagnose, but seek professional assessment of their condition. Neither Hallowell nor Ratey is a hyperactivity researcher-Ratey published only one article on the topic in a professional journal (Ratey, et al. 1992 ) and Hallowell, none. Both remain very active in promoting their work in public circles. Their affiliation with Harvard Medical School gave them some academic legitimacy, but they came to the area of ADHD adults more as professional advocates than as scientific researchers. In a sense, they are moral entrepreneurs for the adult diagnosis (Leffers 1997) .
The 
Diagnostic Institutionalization
By 1994, DSM-IV reflected the growing consensus that adults could be diagnosed with ADHD, provided they had exhibited symptoms as children before the age of seven. Two (out of the five) diagnostic criteria were clearly relevant to adults. First, DSM-IV required that "some impairment must occur in at least 2 settings." While for children, these settings usually mean school and home, the range of settings may be greater for adults and include home, school, work, and other vocational or recreational settings. Secondly and related, "there must be clear evidence of interference with developmentally appropriate social, academic, or occupational functioning." The inclusion of work environments in the criteria section of the manual reflected the central and relatively uncontroversial position that the diagnosis of ADHD in adults now occupied." 9. Production rates do not tell the entire story: while not all of the methylphemdate production is consumed in this country, a sizable portion is. According to the United Nations 1993 statistics, the U.S. produces and consumes more than 80% of the all methylphenidate (Guistolise 1998), but the DEA has estimated that the U.S. consumes over 90 percent of the 8 5 tons produced worldwide (Livingston 1997) .
10 For many years, Ciba-Geigy actively proclaimed the benefits of Ritalin in advertisements. It is interesting that we have been unable to locate drug advertising for Rltalm for ADHD adults in major psychiatric or medical journals. Either Ciba-Geigy advertises Rltalin for ADHD through other channels-e.g., "detail" representatives who call on physicians or through conferences-or they have not promoted Ritalin for adult ADHD. Given the potential market, this is curious and worthy of further investigation.
11 In keeping with the approach begun with DSM-III, however, such markers are not seen as establishing the etiology of the disorder Rather, they are diagnostic in nature. While the manual asserted that no biologic markers cur-The new definition allowed for more variations of symptomatic behavior across and within settings. "It is very unusual for an individual to display the same level of dysfunction in all settings or within the same setting at all times" (APA 1994, p. 79). Adults who might be quite successful at work, but highly inattentive in particular interpersonal relationships and recreational activities, could now be diagnosed with ADHD. As the more expansive criteria in DSM-IV gained acceptance among mental health professionals, some advocated eliminating the requirement that adults be able to retrospectively reconstruct a history of ADHD (Barkley and Biederman 1997). This would permit even greater expansion of the adult ADHD category.
Reports from the American Medical Association (AMA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) supported an expanded ADHD diagnosis. In 1997, the Council on Scientific Affairs of the AMA issued recommendations for treating ADHD, which were published in JAMA (April 8, 1998) . The article noted:
The criteria of what constitutes ADHD in children have broadened, and there is a growing appreciation of the persistence of ADHD into adolescence and adulthood. As a result, more children (especially girls), adolescents, and adults are being diagnosed and treated with stimulant medication, and children are being treated for longer periods of time (Goldman, et al. 1998 
Diagnosis
One of the starkest contrasts to the earlier history of ADHD with children is the vast amount of self-diagnosis of ADHD among adults. Virtually all children were referred by parents or schools to physicians (Conrad 1976). Among adults self-referrals are the norm, and many patients come to physicians apparently seeking an ADHD diagnosis. Frequently, adults who encounter a description of the disorder, sense that "this is me" and go on to seek professional confirmation of their new identity. Another common path to self-diagnosis occurs when parents bring a child to a physician for treatment and remark, "I was the same when I was a kid... Anecdotes in the popular literature suggest that adults who self-diagnose, may recognize the condition in a popular media article or book. Hallowell and Ratey (1994) tell of one woman who noted, "My husband showed me this article in the paper" (p. 26). Comments on Internet sites state directly that it was one of the books on adult ADHD that led individuals to physicians for a diagnosis. Diller (1997) relates that one of his patients came to self-diagnosis after reading Driven to Distraction. Diller points out that, while the physician who is presented with such a self-diagnosed patient may have difficulty establishing the existence of symptoms in their childhood (as opposed to a checklist of symptoms absorbed through reading), the selfdiagnosis, itself, becomes an element that the professional diagnosis must take into account. One psychiatrist wrote a colleague, "Adult ADHD has now become the foremost self-diagnosed condition in my practice. I fear that the condition allows a patient to find a biological cause that is not always reasonable, for job failure, divorce, poor motivation, lack of success, and chronic depression" (Shaffer 1994, p. 638).
Diagnosis-seeking behavior is an integral feature of the emergence of Adult ADHD. This kind of self-labeling, information exchange, and pursuit of diagnosis fuels the social engine medicalizing certain adult troubles. Without it, the spread of Adult ADHD would be seriously limited. In 1987, Prozac (fluoxetine) was introduced as a new type of medication to treat depression. This drug is a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor that directly affected a different group of neurotransmitters with fewer unpleasant side effects than previous types of antidepressants. This drug quickly became a phenomenon in itself, and led to a whole new class of drugs for treating psychiatric and life problems. Peter Kramer's book, Listening to Prozac (1993) and the subsequent news media coverage (e.g., cover stories in Newsweek and New York magazines, and dozens of TV and radio appearances), piqued the public interest in this new drug. Prozac was increasingly depicted as a medication that was a psychic energizer and that could make people feel, in Kramer's terms, "better than well." Prozac was not seen as a medication only for the seriously disturbed, but was a formulation that could improve the lives of people with minor disturbances and distresses.
Critics, Skeptics and
The introduction and popularity of Prozac (and a series of related medications) created a context whereby taking medications for life problems was more acceptable (cf., Diller 1996). Prozac was seen as a drug that was appropriate for a range of psychic difficulties, and whose use could even make an OK life better. It led numerous people to redefine their life woes in terms of mild depression and seek treatment. A person did not have to be severely disturbed to benefit from Prozac. Similarly, Ritalin was now available to adults who had not been diagnosed as hyperactive in childhood, but who were now redefining their life difficulties as related to "inattention," "impulsivity," and "restlessness." The possibility that adults could "have" ADHD became common in parts of the culture and many individuals "recognized" that they, too, suffered from the disorder and sought treatment from physicians. For example, Hallowell and Ratey (1994) recount a case in which a patient demanded Ritalin for their as-yetto-be officially diagnosed condition. As physicians have come to view ADHD symptoms as not limited to children, they are likely to offer an ADHD diagnosis and a "trial on Ritalin" to adults with certain kinds of life difficulties. The key here, however, is that our culture seems to be moving away from "pharmacological Calvinism" (Klerman cited in Healy 1997) to the idea that designer drugs might improve the functioning of most anyone.
Genetics
Genetics is the rising paradigm in medicine and an increasing number of human problems are being attributed to genetic associations, markers, or causes (Conrad 1999). Some experts have long believed that there is a genetic component to ADHD and its predecessor, hyperactivity, but to date, evidence is only suggestive, even though the claims of inheritance date back at least 25 years (Cantwell 1975; Wender 1971; Wood, et al. 1976 ). After reviewing extant evidence, researchers noted, "Family, twin, adoption, and molecular genetic studies show that it has a substantial genetic component" (Faraone and Beiderman 1998, p. 951) . Recent research has focused on a genetically induced imbalance of dopamine. Researchers posit a potential link between ADHD and three genes: D4 dopamine receptor gene, the dopamine transporter gene, and the D2 dopamine receptor gene (Faraone and Beiderman). The thinking is that people who carry the gene overproduce dopamine, which impairs selfcontrol. Some suggested that genetic inheritance might account for as much as 80 percent of the likelihood that one has ADHD (Barkley 1997, p. 39). Despite the research and much published testimony (e.g., parents reiterating about their ADHD child, "I was just like that when I was his age"), the genetic nature of ADHD is still contested. However, the greater the medical and public acceptance of a genetic component of ADHD, the more adult ADHD becomes a social reality. If the disorder is genetic, then it is deemed an intrinsic characteristic of people with the gene. This supports the notion that ADHD is a lifelong disorder, and the position that adults could have the disorder, even though they were never diagnosed as children.12
The Rise of Managed Care
Managed care affects all aspects of medicine, including psychiatry. Health insurance imposes strict limits on the amount of psychotherapy for individual patients. Psychiatrists, now, must make use of utilization review, participate in medication management, consultation, or administering "carve-out programs" (Domino, et al. 1998 ). Mental health advocates and some researchers argue that, under managed care, there is a growing reliance upon various forms of prescription therapies to treat all types of psychiatric and life problems (Johnson 1998). A recent study found that managed care might fuel growth in the pharmaceutical industry (Murray and Deardorff 1998). Undoubtedly, there are now greater incentives for psychiatrists and other physicians to treat all potential mental health problems with medication, rather with than some form of talking or psychotherapy. Managed care tends to replace psychiatrists with primary care physicians who are less versed in "talking therapies" (Stoudemire 1996), and, thereby, increasing the potential for relying on medication for treatment. Searight and Mclaren (1998) describe a "pragmatic assessment and treatment" that occurs when primary care physicians diagnose and treat ADHD children with pharmaceuticals. In fact, there is some evidence that ADHD children are treated with stimulant medications to the exclusion of other "talking therapies" (Woolraich, et al. 1990 ). It is likely there are similar trends with adult ADHD.
Furthermore, this apparent treatment preference may encourage the expansion of drug treatable diagnoses, since these are reimbursable under managed care. It is feasible that problems that might have been diagnosed differently two decades ago (e.g., adult adjustment reaction) or seen as life dissatisfaction, now can be diagnosed and treated as ADHD. While we do not claim that managed care has caused the rise of adult ADHD, it is part of the context that makes ADHD a more likely diagnosis than in the past.
Some Consequences of the Adult ADHD Diagnosis
In a paper over two decades ago, Conrad (1975) outlined some of the ramifications of the medicalization of hyperactive behavior. These included: (1) the problem of expert control; (2) the uses of medical social control; (3) the individualization of social problems; and (4) the depoliticization of deviant behavior. To these, he later added the dislocation of responsibility from the individual to the nether world of biophysiological functioning (Conrad and Schneider 1992). Most of these can be applied to adult ADHD as well. The self-initiated and even selfdiagnosed nature of most adult ADHD puts a different emphasis on some of these issues (e.g., depolitization) but does not neutralize them. With adult ADHD, it may be the shift from personal responsibility and the individualization of life problems that are most critical. Creating a "medical excuse" directs attention away from social forces to biogenic ones and shifts blame from the person to the body. Thus, adult ADHD carries with it some unique consequences, especially since most cases are self-referred adults.
The Medicalization of Underperformance
What is interesting about adult ADHD is that many of the individuals who are given the diagnosis are, by some measures, successful individuals. Ratey and Hallowell, for example, are both psychiatrists affiliated with a major medical school and authors of a best-selling book, yet identify themselves as having ADHD. Frank Wolkenberg was a successful freelance artist. In a widely publicized and controversial article, James Trilling (1999) characterized both himself (a professor and author) and his late father, the renowned literary critic, Lionel Trilling, as suffering from ADHD. Both lay and professional accounts of adult ADHD commonly provide examples of adults who have achieved success by many conventional social measures (e.g., Hallowell and Ratey 1994; Leffers 1997) . There are, of course, individuals with limited achievement who are also defined as ADHD, but the issues remain similar. In fact, Hallowell and Ratey see their audience as "chronic underachievers" whose difficulties are caused, not by a lack of self-discipline, but by an inborn neurological condition.
For adults, the issue surrounding ADHD is performance, not behavior. As Diller (1997, p. 277) notes:
In broadest terms, moving from childhood to later life for those with ADD involves a shift from problems with behavior to problems with performance. The simple fact of hyperactivity or impulsivity is not the chief concern for teens and adults: rather, it's their disorganization, irresponsibility, procrastination, and inability to complete tasks. 
A New Disability
A diagnosis of ADHD puts an individual into the larger category of having a "disability," which can serve as a gateway to potential claims to certain benefits and accommodations. Within this "rights" framework, the diagnosis has been interpreted, primarily, as a learning disorder (rather than a psychiatric disorder). While previous research has analyzed the role of ADHD-based claims to rights within children's education (cf., Searight and Mclaren 1998), the expansion of the diagnosis permits the medicalization of adult ADHD to gain further legal legitimization within the institutions of medicine, as well as employment and adult education.
As ADHD was coming to be identified as a disorder among adults in the early 1990s, individuals began to pursue legal actions to lay claim to rights under legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Although rights are guaranteed under these statutes, they are only enforceable through civil suit. ADHD is not one of the conditions explicitly covered under the ADA, yet advocates have argued that the disorder falls under the umbrella of the law. When ADHD is of sufficient severity to affect an otherwise qualified individual by limiting a major life activity, protections are afforded under the ADA (Latham and Latham 1995) . Individuals with ADHD have filed suits so that they might receive reasonable accommodations in education and in the workplace (Jaffe 1995). For example, a search using the legal database of Lexis-Nexis, identified 211 cases in federal labor law between 1980 and 1999 that concern ADHD (many of which include school boards or universities).
Clearly a diagnosis of adult ADHD carries with it a certain currency in the public sphere. The public is aware of these disability-related issues. A key article appeared in the Wall Street Journal in 1993 that outlined workplace and criminal justice issues for those with ADHD. A book on ADD related disability law was published for advocates in 1992 (Latham and Latham 1992) . Not only are individuals with ADHD the potential beneficiaries of a "medical excuse" for their life problems, but they may be eligible for specific benefits under the ADA. Individuals who, prior to diagnosis, would not have seen themselves having a disability find themselves reaping the benefits of disability legislation. Under the ADA, individuals with ADHD are entitled to "reasonable accommodations" if their disorder is sufficiently severe to interfere with tasks that they are otherwise qualified to perform. Accommodations could include untimed tests, oral versus written administration of tests or instructions, additional time to complete tasks, structured work assignments with written instructions, extra clerical support, more frequent performance appraisals, checklists for multi-stage tasks, diminished capacity arguments in criminal suits, and protection against discrimination (taken from Latham and Latham 1995; Nadeau 1995) . The 1997 guidelines from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) led to a list of accommodations for ADHD-diagnosed employees, including special office furniture, equipment such as tape recorders and laptops, and "organizational schemes (color coding, buddy systems, alarm clocks, and other 'reminders') designed to keep such employees on track" (Eberstadt 1999 ).
On Adult ADHD and Medicalized Category Expansion
Adult ADHD offers a clear example of how a medicalized category can expand to include a wider range of troubles within its definition. ADHD's expansion was, primarily, accomplished by refocusing the diagnosis on inattention, rather than hyperactivity and stretching the age criteria. This allowed for the inclusion of an entire population of people and their problems that were excluded by the original conception of hyperactive children.
The expanded category, adult ADHD, has become what Ian Hacking (1995, p. 96) terms "an object of knowledge" with discernable symptoms, putative causes, and particular treatment and care. Adult ADHD is recognized widely as an entity that is real, a "natural category" that only needs proper application. While thirty years ago adult ADHD might have been an oxymoron, today it is deemed a discrete disorder that can be claimed and diagnosed.
What is particularly interesting about the adult ADHD case is the role of lay groups in promoting the expansive medicalization. The lay-professional alliance (see also, Leffers 1997 (Scheff 1984) , which suggests a fundamental conflict between social control agents and putative deviants. In the adult ADHD case, the diagnosis is embraced and promoted by the people who receive it. This suggests that this may be a different kind of psychiatric diagnosis from those sociologists typically study, one that is sought out by the very people to whom it is to be applied. In this case, medication treatment may be seen as much as an enhancement as a form of social control.
Studies have shown that the interaction of lay and professional claims-makers, rather than "medical imperialism," typically underlies the medicalization process. But the case of adult ADHD indicates that popularization may also play a part in diagnostic expansion. Media, including TV, popular literature, and now the Internet, spread the word quickly about illnesses and treatment. This popularization of symptoms and diagnoses can create new "markets" for disorders and empower previously unidentified sufferers to seek treatment as new or expanded medical explanations become popularly available. The widespread popular acceptance of entities as illnesses suggests a feedback loop among professionals, claims-makers, media, and the public in terms of the creation, expansion, and application of illness categories. Just as medicalization research has moved from focusing primarily on the claims and activities of physicians, to examining the interplay of professional and lay claims-makers, it behooves us to investigate how medical diagnoses penetrate in the public consciousness and become "takenfor-granted as an objective natural entity" in the public sphere (Horwitz forthcoming). Such medical diagnostic entities are often accepted without recognizing their history and with an assumption of their universal categorical significance regardless of cultural context. Within an increasingly medically aware public reside individuals who take identified "symptoms" as revealing an underlying disease condition and, in cases like adult ADHD, may seek to attain their diagnosis of choice.
But in terms of diagnostic expansion, the ADHD case is not unique. We can point to other cases where medicalized categories, which were originally developed and legitimated for one set of problems, were extended or reframed to include a broader range of problems. Several examples come to mind. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was originally conceived of as a disorder of returning Viet Nam war veterans who suffered from the after affects of brutal combat experience (e.g., with flashbacks, sleep problems, intense anxiety, etc.) (Scott 1990; Young 1995) . But in recent years, PTSD has been applied to rape and incest survivors, disaster victims, and witnesses to violence. Alcoholism was medicalized, in large part, due to the efforts of AA (Conrad and Schneider 1992), but the medicalization has expanded to include adult children of alcoholics, enablers, and especially "codependency" (Irvine 1999). Child abuse, which was originally limited to battering, has expanded to include sexual abuse and neglect, and to lesser extent, child pornography and exploitation (cf., Best 1990 and 1999) and, to a degree, spawned the larger domain of domestic violence (including woman battering and elder abuse). In 1972, multiple personality disorder was a rare diagnosis (estimated at less than a dozen cases in 50 years); by 1992, thousands of multiples were diagnosed. This "epidemic" resulted from the diagnostic reconceptualization to "dissociative identity disorder" in DSM-IIIR with less restrictive criteria and an association with child abuse (Hacking 1995). 13
Definitional categories are potentially elastic and can be stretched to include more phenomena within their realm. This may be particularly true with medicalized categories because of the social advantages of medical definitions (e.g., mitigation of personal blame, medical excuse, health insurance, or disability benefits), although fiscal constraints of medicine may set limits on certain applications (Conrad 2000). While, in general, the expansion of medical categories may be limited by the carrying capacity of the medical profession and the health insurance industry (cf., Hilgartner and Bosk 1988), it appears that with active claims-makers, committed stake-holders, and receptive potential clients, diagnostic expansion can occur readily and with minimal opposition. Similar to domain expansion, diagnostic expansion begins with established disorders and moves toward more problematic claims. One legitimated medical category can beget others.
It is interesting to consider whether a parallel process of diagnostic contraction may take place. Some have suggested this narrowing has occurred for serious mental illness. With the increased reliance on primary care providers in managed care, for example, some research has suggested an underrecognition of some serious mental disorders (Stoudemire 1996). Others have noted that the "medical necessity" standard has altered, not only treatment, but also diagnosis (Ford 1998). It stands to reason that, in the age of managed care, shrinkage of the medical domain is a likely outcome. Yet as noted in the adult ADHD example, managed care may have paradoxically played a role in the emergence of this new category. Whatever the ultimate outcome of problem definitions, it seems clear the flexibility of certain medical diagnoses allows for expansion and, thus, the increase of medicalization in our society. 13. In a different domain, the medlcalization of childbirth has been the gateway to the medicalization of infertility, pregnancy, the post-natal period, and contributed to the medicalization of sexuality and sexual dysfunction.
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